Interest group influence in micro-states: the role of networking skills by Kanol, Direnç
European Journal of Government and Economics 
Volume 3, Number 1 (June 2014) 
ISSN: 2254-7088 
47 
Interest group influence in micro-states: the role 
of networking skills 
Direnç Kanol, University of Siena, Italy 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that an interest group’s networking skills in micro-states may be 
as important, if not more important than other variables discussed in the interest 
group influence literature. This argument is based on the recent literature on 
democratisation in micro-states which shows that politics in these states is 
personalistic in nature. The argument is supported by expert interviews undertaken 
in the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
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What determines interest group influence? This question is crucial to all who value 
democracy. In theory, one-person, one-vote rule should ensure that each citizen 
has an equal say in public policy. This is, however, far from the truth. Organised 
interests try to influence policy and at times, they achieve their goals. Hence, the 
public policy literature focuses on how influential organised interests are and why 
one group may be influential whereas another may not be. The predominant belief 
in the literature is that providing information and offering citizen-support to the 
policy-makers enable interest groups to exert influence. The level of influence also 
depends on the preferences of the policy-makers, public opinion and issue 
salience. Interest group literature, however, does not pay enough attention to the 
role of networking skills. This paper argues that an interest group’s networking 
skills may be as important, if not more important than other variables discussed in 
the interest group literature. This argument is based on the recent literature on 
democratisation in micro-states which shows that politics in these states are 
personalistic in nature. Personal ties are crucial for getting things done. The 
argument is supported by empirical evidence gathered from expert interviews in the 
Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The following 
section reviews the interest group literature and shows that the role of networking 
skills as a determinant of influence is critically under-researched. The section after 
that describes the nature of politics in micro-states and generates a proposition 
regarding interest group influence in these states. After discussing the method and 
presenting the findings from the in-depth interviews, the final part discusses the 
implications of this study. 
Interest Group Influence: A Literature Review 
Some authors argue that interest groups lobby ‘friendly’ legislators, those who 
already agree with them, and the legislators use the interest groups to acquire 
much needed information to attain their goals (Bauer et al, 1963; Milbrath, 1963). 
This view has been criticised by some who suggest that lobbying sympathisers 
serves only to counteract the effect of other groups trying to push the policy in the 
opposite direction, and lobbying ‘foes’ is not an exception but a norm (Austen-
Smith and Wright, 1994). Also, we should not forget that there are a significant 
number of scholars who argue that lobbying ‘swing’ legislators is also common 
(Smith, 1984; Wright, 1990; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). If the first group of 
authors is right, this either means that interest groups are mere information 
conveyors to policy-makers and they do not exert much influence on policy-makers 
(Hall and Wayman, 1990) or they select to convey information to ‘friends’ in power 
in order to achieve their own objectives that is congruent with the public actors’ 
objectives (Hall and Deardorff, 2006).  
Although the nature of interest group influence is still a puzzle, exploring the 
determinants of interest group influence is equally important. The most 
parsimonious theory that can be used to explain the relationship between interest 
groups and decision-makers to date is the resource dependence theory. The roots 
of this theory can be found in the work of the sociologists Levine and White (1961). 
An important extension to the resource dependence perspective was presented by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003). Studying health organisations, Levine and White 
(1961) argued that no organisation is able to control all the resources it needs to 
achieve its goals. This is why organisations are dependent on other organisations 
to accomplish their tasks (Levine and White, 1961). According to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003), interdependence is the key word for explaining exchange between 
organisations. Dependence of one organisation on another can be measured by 
the importance of the resource that the organisation receives through interactions 
with the other, measured in turn by the relative magnitude and the nature of the 
resource (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). If an organisation absolutely needs a certain 
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type of resource to attain its goals, then this resource is essential for that 
organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Dependence on the environment refers 
to the importance of the resource to the organisation demanding that resource as 
well as the availability of the resource from other sources (Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003). Based on this understanding, one may argue that 
organisations are expected to be more responsive to other organisations that 
control the most problematic/critical resource (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
As a priority, we need to start the discussion about governmental organisations by 
acknowledging their considerable power when choosing which interest groups to 
contact and which ones not to contact. Nevertheless, like any other organisation, 
governmental organisations do not possess all the resources they need to 
accomplish their tasks. So, it is inevitable that the criticality of the resources 
possessed by interest groups will have an effect on governmental authorities’ 
decision to engage in resource exchange with these groups. It should come as no 
surprise that scholars studying access and influence of interest groups to 
governmental actors have benefited from this theory. Scholars working on the 
European Union produced interesting research that strived to explain the logic of 
access and influence by using the resource dependence theory (Bouwen, 2004; 
Klüver, 2013). 
The vast majority of research on interest groups concentrates on the power of 
information as a determinant of influence regardless of the method or discipline. 
We can speak of two types of information: political information and technical 
information. Plausibly, most technical information would also entail some political 
aspects but what matters is that technical information gives predictions about policy 
consequences in the technical sense. Political information, on the other hand, is 
about signalling mobilisation consequences of the group or other groups as a result 
of an action that could be taken by a policy-maker (Heitshusen, 2000, Potters and 
van Winden, 1992; Austen-Smith, 1998). Governmental officials’ time is restricted 
and they are neither able nor willing to give access and influence to each and 
every interest group. In line with the resource dependence theory, one can argue 
that policy-makers grant access and influence to informative groups (Reenock and 
Gerber, 2008; Crombez, 2002; Bouwen, 2004; Klüver, 2013). 
Another crucial resource is citizen-support (Klüver, 2013). Policy-makers try to 
understand the magnitude of support for or opposition against a policy-proposal 
because if policy-makers enact laws that are highly unpopular, they pay for this in 
the next election (Kingdon, 1995; Fiorina, 1989; Mayhew, 1974; Arnold, 1990). 
With re-election prospects in mind, public actors look to have the endorsement of 
organisations with the support of a sizeable number of citizens (Klüver, 2013). 
Therefore, based on the resource dependence perspective, citizen support can be 
interpreted as a good for access and influence where electoral support is the 
causal mechanism that gives meaning to this relationship. Citizen support does not 
only affect the politicians with the ambition to get re-elected but also the 
bureaucrats. Despite the fact that bureaucrats may have more manoeuvring space 
as they do not run in the elections, they look for public endorsement and legitimacy 
(Poppelaars, 2009). The higher the support of citizens an organisation has that 
gives its endorsement to a bureaucrat, the higher the perceived legitimacy of that 
bureaucrat will be. Therefore, citizen support is also expected to affect bureaucrats 
as well as politicians. 
Although resource dependence theory suggests a parsimonious framework for 
explaining influence, we cannot oversee the varying nature of political context and 
its impact on the opportunity to exert influence. Political opportunity structures 
(Kitschelt, 1986; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004) and political mediation (Amenta et al, 
1992; Amenta et al, 1994; Amenta et al, 2005) theories that were developed by 
scholars studying social movements took this aspect into account and suggested 
that the characteristics of the political system and the politicians have a 
considerable amount of impact on social movement outcomes. Various studies 
European Journal of Government and Economics 3(1) 
 
50
show that interest groups are more likely to exert influence, for instance, when the 
politicians are friendlier towards the cause of the lobbyists (Kriesi et al, 1995; 
Giugni, 2004; 2007; Soule and Olzak, 2004; McVeigh et al, 2003). This finding 
suggests that interest group influence also depends on which politicians are in 
power and interest groups may have to adjust their strategies depending on the 
political context.  
Public opinion is also important. Re-election motivated politicians take what the 
public thinks about a certain issue and how strongly they feel about this issue into 
account (Kingdon, 1995; Fiorina, 1989; Mayhew, 1974; Arnold, 1990). There are 
mixed findings in the literature. Some research found that policy-makers are not 
responsive to public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; 2002; Cohen, 1997). 
However, the predominant belief in the literature based on empirical findings is that 
public opinion matters. Politicians are more likely to pass laws that are popular 
(Page and Shapiro, 1983; Burstein, 2003; Erikson et al, 2002; Monroe, 1998; Lax 
and Phillips, 2009). A lobbyist that advocates an issue that is clearly opposed by 
the public may not have much success.  
We should also take issue salience into account. Baumgartner et al (2009) argues 
that most issues do not find a place on the agenda of the policy-makers. Policy-
making process does not resemble an incrementalist one as Lindblom (1959) 
argued. According to Lindblom (1959), the policy-making process involves many 
actors and moves in small steps. A rather recent major work shows that this 
argument could be false (Baumgartner et al, 2009). Baumgartner et al’s (2009) 
results are based on Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993)  punctuated-equilibrium 
model which argues that most issues remain stable for most of the time, and where 
policy-change occurs, it follows a pattern that is contrary to the logic of 
incrementalism. Policy-change occurs very rapidly in few issue areas (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993). Salience of an issue may have a positive impact on the likelihood 
of an interest group’s success in exerting influence on the policy agenda (Burstein, 
1981; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Haider-Markel, 1996; 2003). Once an issue 
becomes very salient and is placed on the political agenda, we may observe a 
rapid change of policy. 
What is clearly lacking in the interest group influence literature is a discussion 
about the role of networking skills. The role of networking skills is only very 
indirectly mentioned in a few studies such as Carpenter et al (1998), who argue 
that interest groups exist in a network. A group which possesses weak ties with a 
sizeable number of groups in this network is able to receive and convey 
information, which in turn, provides it access to the governmental actors. Heaney 
(2006) shows that playing a brokerage role between disconnected lobbying 
coalitions and political parties enhances a group’s influence in the policy-making 
process. Finally, Beyers and Braun (2014) argue that an interest group’s ability to 
bridge different coalitions increases its chances of gaining access to the policy-
makers. However, none of these studies directly deal with the capacity of the 
individuals within interest groups to establish direct relationships with the policy-
makers. 
The Nature of Politics in Micro-states and its 
Implications for Interest Group Influence 
Different authors used different population sizes to define which states can be 
defined as micro-states (Anckar, 2010). Using certain numbers, however, can be 
problematic. Consider, for instance, that we use 500.000 people as a ceiling to 
determine if a state is indeed a micro-state or not. Can we really assume that 
theoretical arguments that apply to a country of 490.000 people do not apply to a 
country of 510.000 people? This paper uses a more deductive approach to defining 
micro-states that serve the topical purpose of this paper. A micro-state is a very 
small country with a very small number of population size and with a very large 
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number of people knowing a large part of the rest of the population. The proverbial 
‘everyone knows everyone’ is a crucial definition of the social and political life in 
micro-states. This deductive understanding would corroborate with the 
classification schemes of scholars who keep Fiji with a population of 780.000 within 
the discussion about micro-states but exclude Papua New Guinea, with a 
population of 4 million (Anckar, 2002a). Anckar (2003; 2008) uses the 1 million 
ceiling and suggests that there are 42 micro-states in the world. Therefore, the 
small size of these states should not mean that careful inquiries about their society 
and politics can be neglected. 
Unlike the earlier studies which suggested that smallness is good for democracy 
(Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Hadenius, 1992; Srebrnik, 2004), the recent literature 
suggests that the relationship between smallness and democracy is ambiguous at 
best and small size may, in fact, have a negative effect on the quality of democracy 
(Veenendaal, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; Corbett, 2013). The earlier literature points to 
homogeneity, a sense of fellowship and community, a lack of complexity in solving 
social and political issues, and the proximity between the rulers and the citizens as 
mechanisms to establish a positive link between smallness and quality of 
democracy (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Ott, 2000; Anckar, 2002a; 2002b). The recent 
literature, however, suggests that politics in micro-states is more ‘informal’ in 
nature. Almost everything depends on personal relationships. Obligations to family 
and kin precedes the obligations to the society as a whole (Corbett, 2013). Thus, 
civic culture and social capital, which are argued to be essential parts of embedded 
democracies are not found in micro-states. The proximity between the rulers and 
the citizens which is argued to be a boon can actually be a bane. Consider, for 
instance, the decision-making process for public appointments. It is very hard for 
the elected officials to be impartial when family, kin and friends are extremely 
important in social life and when there are many individuals that could be classified 
as either of these three. It is, also, almost impossible to avoid people one falls apart 
with. Therefore, elected officials try to live up to the expectations of their close ones 
and acquaintances and the citizens try to keep good relationships with their 
government at all times. Politics is conducted outside of the public domain. This 
causes issues with nepotism and clientelism (Corbett, 2013; Veenendaal, 2013a; 
2013c).    
If politics in micro-states is personalistic in nature, then the organised interests 
should master the art of establishing personal relationships, in order to exert 
influence on the policy-making process. In these states, who you know may be 
much more important than what you know (information), which runs counter to the 
decades of theorising in the interest group literature. Networking skills, therefore, 
may be particularly important for exerting influence in micro-states. By networking 
skills, I mean the ability of an individual to meet and establish good contacts with 
the governmental actors. A person may have the intellectual resources to generate 
and provide information to the governmental actors. However, this does not mean 
that he/she has the skills to establish weak or strong ties with these governmental 
actors. Once a relationship between an interest group and a governmental actor is 
established, interest groups can ask for ‘favours’ from their contacts in 
governmental posts which is shown to be the main form of policy-making in the 
highly personalistic and clientelistic political decision-making process in micro-
states. Therefore, networking skills are expected to be a strong determinant of 
interest group influence in micro-states. 
Method 
Expert-interviewing is a valuable technique when it comes to discovering what 
affects interest group influence. Influence is the primary goal of lobbying. By 
practicing lobbying for long years, experts learn what works, what does not work 
and why. Therefore, they are in a good position to suggest what tactics work and 
what the exogenous factors that may affect their influence may be. Different 
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interest groups may have different opinions about these exogenous factors. The 
goal of expert-interviewing method is not to get as many interviews as possible, but 
to get as many interviews from people who have the most in-depth information as 
possible. Therefore, a policy field is chosen first and the names of the 
organisations that have the most in-depth information about how to exert influence 
are obtained. 
The Civil Society Organisations Directory (2011) provides a good source to obtain 
the emails of a population of interest groups, both in the Republic of Cyprus and 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the island of Cyprus. The Republic of 
Cyprus was established in 1960 as a partnership state between the Greek Cypriots 
and the Turkish Cypriots. After civil and political conflict intensified between these 
two communities, it has become a Greek Cypriot state in 1963. The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983. However, it is only 
recognised by Turkey which makes it fall under the de facto state classification. 
These are micro-states with population sizes of 862,000 (Statistical Service of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 2011) and 294,906 (Devlet Planlama Örgütü, 2011) 
respectively. Therefore, concentrating on lobbying in these two states offers an 
opportunity to analyse the potential impact of networking skills for exerting 
influence in micro-states. I focused on the field of peacebuilding for the purposes of 
this paper since the experts in this field could be identified easily. A list of the 
population of organisations that potentially deal with peace related issues during 
the months of July and August 2012 is created. From August 2012 to October 
2012, I conducted a survey that asked these organisations to name 3 well known 
peacebuilding organisations that are active in Cyprus in order increase the number 
of observations. It should be stressed that an interest group in this paper refers to 
any non-governmental group that tries to influence public policy either by inside 
lobbying or outside lobbying tactics. Therefore, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) which engage in lobbying the governmental actors classify as interest 
groups. 
Overall, 41 civil society organisations were found to be active in the field of 
peacebuilding with varying degrees of intensity. These organisations were emailed 
a questionnaire followed by a reminder email in case no response after a month. 
25 organisations replied to the emails with a response rate of 61 percent. These 
organisations were asked if they were able to initiate contact with the decision-
makers at the governmental level face-to-face, via internet, phone or by other 
similar means in order to promote peace in the last year. Out of these 25 
organisations that responded to the survey, 14 of them answered ‘yes’ to this 
question. Considering also the list of organisations that were named by other 
organisations as one of the 3 well known peacebuilding organisations, 6 
peacebuilding organisations out of these 14 organisations were identified as true 
experts in the field of peace lobbying.1 I also included a Turkish Cypriot policy-
maker in the sample who was responsible for deciding the main aspects of the 
peace negotiations with the Greek Cypriots. Kudret Özersay, the chief Turkish 
Cypriot negotiator responsible for the negotiations with the Greek Cypriots from 
April 2010 to June 2012 was included in the sample as an expert policy-maker who 
is not a lobbyist but has expert knowledge on lobbying. Özersay was lobbied by 
various organisations with respect to the reunification/peace issue. Managers 
and/or project managers of these organisations and the policy-maker were 
interviewed face to face with the open-ended interview method. They were asked 
about the possible ways to gain influence and prompts and probes were posed 
depending on the discussion that took place. Interviews lasted approximately 30 
                                                                                                         
1 These organisations are: Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, The Management Centre 
of the Mediterranean, NGO Support-Centre, Cyprus Academic Dialogue, Cyprus 2015 and The Cyprus 
Community Media Centre. 
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minutes on average. The interviewees agreed to be recorded and identified for the 
academic purposes of this project.  
Results 
In this section, the findings from the interviews are presented. Evidence for the 
factors that were discussed in the literature review section are presented under 
separate sub-headings. The role of networking skills is discussed at the end of this 
section. 
Information 
The experts suggested that the main factors discussed in the literature are all 
relevant. Findings from the in-depth interviews provide evidence for the value of 
conveying information to the policy-makers. The common viewpoint of the 
interviewees is that technical information that could be of use to the policy-makers 
can make a big difference. In line with the resource dependence theory, the 
consensus is that the type of information matters. If peacebuilding organisations 
possess information that is valuable to the policy-makers and if it cannot be offered 
to them by other sources, the likelihood of influence increases. The experts 
suggested that providing information to the policy-makers is very important for 
gaining access. They also believe that it can increase the likelihood of exerting 
influence:  
Even the policy-makers at the highest levels whom you might assume to have a network of 
people supplying them information, they are not aware of certain things… They do not know… 
So if you give them information that they did not know about, they may realise the usefulness 
of this information. Let me give you an example... We did research on teachers’ perception on 
history teaching about three years ago and we found out that teachers were positive towards 
reform in history teaching. The policy-makers, on the other hand, thought on the contrary. So, 
they were afraid of something that did not exist. If you can bring new information in a rather 
scientific or objective way, you have the space to influence the policy-maker during the 
interaction process. (Expert 1) 
From our experience, I think the more you contribute to the immediate interest of the decision-
makers, the more access and influence you will have. So if you are giving them something 
they can use and this is something they don’t have and they find this valuable, then the 
relationship becomes more of a mutual benefit kind. Why do we have access as Cyprus 
2015? Because we say listen; if you give up Güzelyurt (Morphou) or Maraş (Varosha), this is 
how much reaction you will get, or if you accept more than fifty thousand people of Turkish 
origin to become citizens of a united Cyprus, this is how much reaction you will get. How 
many Greek Cypriots will accept, not to be reinstated to their old properties? This is very 
valuable information... Decision-makers need information. We try to bring expert knowledge to 
the attention of the policy-makers that they usually lack because they are surrounded by 
people who are not really experts… This can be technical or political information but 
information should be relevant with the needs of the policy-makers. (Expert 2) 
Citizen Support 
Information, however, is not the only thing the policy-makers need. Politicians need 
votes. In other words, they need citizen support. Bureaucrats need legitimacy and 
they get this via citizen support as well. How many members a peacebuilding 
organisation is representing or how many people can it mobilise? These are very 
important questions. The interviewees suggest that citizen support is pivotal for 
exerting influence: 
Because the number of members an organisation is representing means votes for them, when 
the politicians are judging whether they should give you an appointment or take your ideas 
into consideration, they always ask themselves; ‘I am going to give him my half an hour or so; 
in return, what am I going to get from this guy? First, I can gain some information, but 
secondly and sometimes more importantly, it is very important for me to accept this guy 
because he may be representing 1,000 votes. I have to take him into consideration!. (Expert 
3) 




Although the exchange argument may be valid, we should also consider that 
influence is decided by exogenous political factors. The experts were of the same 
opinion that it is much more difficult to convince policy-makers that have a more 
ethno-nationalist approach to the Cyprus problem. Similarly, influence is limited 
when peace-building organisations lobby the policy-makers that are not favourably 
disposed toward civil society participation in the policy-making process. This 
argument is in line with the political opportunity structures and political mediation 
theories that argue that having political allies increases the likelihood of influence: 
Naturally, the ‘leftist’ policy-makers that work on reconciliation are more inclined to listen to 
us. I’d lobby both friendly and non-friendly politicians though. Because, in fact, you would 
need a good mix of people. The positive ones will most likely take you further. The negative 
ones, on the other hand, if you never approach them, then you would never have a chance to 
have an attempt to convert them. (Expert 4) 
When you have a certain character who is negative towards civil society participation in 
policy-making and sees you as a nuisance and thinks that you are rocking the boat, he/she is 
going to shy away from you and it will be much harder to deal with him/her. (Expert 5) 
Public Opinion 
The experts also mentioned the possible impact of public opinion. Based on the 
findings in the literature, it is expected that if public opinion is not in line with the 
demands of the peacebuilding organisations, then these organisations are less 
likely to be able to exert influence. Interviewees suggest that this may be the case. 
However, what is clear is that most issues that the lobbyists work on are more 
technical in nature and the preferences of the policy-maker himself/herself, 
irrespective of the public opinion, could be a more decisive exogenous factor that 
determines if influence takes place or not: 
Of course, politicians, who want to be re-elected are not going to tell you ‘yes’ if you want 
something that a large number of voters are against. But there are ways around this. Many 
times, we work on small technical issues that do not catch the eye of the public. Therefore, 
politicians are less concerned with the public opinion in such cases. (Expert 3) 
Issue Salience 
Regarding issue salience and the likelihood of success, some interviewees 
suggested that lobbyists are more likely to be successful when there is a dynamic 
for resolving the problem at the highest political level. When there are some 
prospects with respect to the solution of the Cyprus problem and the issue is 
salient, policy-makers are more likely to be willing to engage with the lobbyists: 
One very important issue is the general conjecture that you are living in. For example, if there 
is a situation when the reconciliation issue is becoming quite hot in the sense that we are at a 
stage of critical point in the negotiation process, it affects your work. In those times, peace 
issue occupies a very high spot on the agenda of the policy-makers and it is easier to 
influence those people because all of a sudden, they start thinking about reconciliation and 
peace and they want some ideas or some technical knowledge. When there is no possibility 
and everybody is very pessimistic about things, policy-makers just put the issue at the bottom 
of their agenda and they don’t want to hear anything about it. (Expert 3) 
Networking Skills 
The experts, however, stressed that none of these variables may be as important 
as networking skills. In a small country, it is very important that people know the 
policy-makers. Most individuals working for powerful interest groups have at least a 
few contacts, controlling the gates of political power. Personal relationships make 
access and influence much more likely. It is much easier to establish long-term 
relationships with the governmental actors and ask for certain policies to be 
enacted if one possesses the skills to establish these contacts. Interest group 
literature does not pay enough attention to the role of networking skills. The 
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following quotations provide evidence for the critical nature of personal 
relationships and the skills to establish these relationships: 
Personal contacts are very important. It is easier for the civil society representatives who 
know people to access the authorities and it is easier for the authorities to have access to civil 
society as well. (Expert 6) 
I am an academic myself, and I happen to know the Cyprus problem quite well, let’s say, 
since this is my research area and all that, I have a specific name that some people know, 
especially by the decision-makers. Then, for example, I, as a member of a CSO, if I want to 
have access, to want to go and see, to talk to a decision-maker, compared to somebody, let’s 
say an assistant at the Eastern Mediterranean University, of course, it makes a very big 
difference. (Expert 2) 
I mean networking is an issue here ok… So, if an ex-policy maker establishes an NGO then 
obviously, he knows the channels or she knows the channels and she knows how to make a 
move and hence that NGO has … I’m giving an extreme situation… Let’s say two academics 
and two politicians and two business advisors get together and form an NGO then that 
becomes a very strong structure immediately. Because there is enough weight and 
networking substance that will increase access and influence. So by extension, networking is 
very important. (Expert 4) 
I would stress the word capacity because you might have a hundred staff and not one of them 
may have the capacity to exert influence. You know when we talk about capacity you are also 
talking about people having good networks, not just their education and experience, but you 
know they might have good networks and you know they can pull the strings, this is quite 
important. (Expert 3) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper argues that networking skills are an important determinant of interest 
group influence in micro-states. Since the role of networking skills is under-
researched, the paper aimed to contribute to the literature on the determinants of 
interest group influence by providing evidence from the interviews undertaken in 
the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The 
qualitative data obtained from peace advocacy experts in these two states 
provided some evidence for this hypothesis.  
A couple of points should be made for guiding future research on this topic. Expert 
interviews conducted for this paper provided valuable evidence for the role of 
networking skills in the influence game. However, the absence of expert interview 
data from large states prevented testing a possible difference between interest 
group influence in micro-states and large states. Networking skills may actually be 
more valuable for exerting influence in micro-states than large states when the 
highly personalistic nature of politics in micro-states is taken into consideration. 
Future research could benefit from a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
analysis and conduct a larger number of interviews both from a micro-state and a 
large state to see if networking skills are significantly more important for influencing 
political actors in micro-states than in large states.  
A careful reader may also question if the personalistic and clientelistic nature of 
politics in the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is 
indeed due to its smallness rather than other factors. After all, it is a fact that the 
countries in Southern Europe show similar political characteristics with these two 
micro-states when compared to the Northern European countries. There is, 
however, much evidence that can suggest that smallness of these two states has 
an independent effect other than the geographical location of these micro-states. 
This is due to the opportunity available for us to compare the nature of politics in 
other micro-states with the two micro-states analysed in this paper. Brilliant in-
depth research from micro-states all over the world suggest that similar 
phenomena exist in most micro-states in regard to the political process (see 
Corbett, 2013; Veenendaal, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c).  
At the expense of sounding tautological, it should be stressed that more research 
in different countries and other policy areas is needed to substantiate the argument 
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put forward. Nevertheless, this study aims to contribute to the literature on interest 
group influence and the nature of politics in micro-states. 
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